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Deposit guarantee schemes provide a degree of protec-
tion for depositors’ savings when a fi  nancial institution is 
unable to fulfi  l repayment. These schemes have been in 
existence for a long time, but the recent fi  nancial crisis 
once again demonstrated their importance.
As explained in the fi  rst section of this article, deposit 
guarantee schemes are not simply consumer protection 
instruments ; they also make a major contribution towards 
fi  nancial stability.
The second section focuses on the advantages and dis-
advantages of deposit guarantee schemes : they must be 
carefully designed to achieve two goals simultaneously, 
as far as possible  : namely, consumer protection and 
fi  nancial stability.
The third section describes the current Belgian deposit 
guarantee scheme and comments in particular on the way 
it has been modifi  ed in the context of the fi  nancial crisis.
Finally, the fourth section analyses the European 
Commission’s recent proposals for introducing a new 
Directive on deposit guarantee schemes, setting out the 
implications of those proposals and the challenges ahead.
1.  Role of deposit guarantee schemes 
in fi  nancial policy
The establishment of a deposit guarantee scheme has 
two main aims : the protection of depositors’ savings and 
the maintenance of fi  nancial stability by the avoidance of 
bank failures.
1.1  Depositor protection
The primary purpose of establishing a deposit guarantee 
scheme is to ensure repayment of depositors falling victim 
to a bank failure.
Generally speaking, most individual depositors have little 
inclination to check how their bank uses their deposits. 
Moreover, there is considerable information asymmetry 
between depositors and bank managers, since the former 
are not generally able to judge and control the vary-
ing degrees of risk in the latter’s management strategy 
(Madiès, 2009a). The cost of acquiring the information 
on the risk profi   le of the bank’s investments is prob-
ably excessive in relation to the resulting advantage for 
depositors.
Deposit guarantee schemes are therefore justifi   ed by 
the need to protect and represent depositors, seen as a 
vulnerable population, in order to remedy their lack of 
control. When such a scheme is set up, the information 
asymmetry is transferred from the depositors to the body 
supervising the credit institutions which, in view of its 
expertise and opportunities for investigation, is assumed 
to be in a better position to overcome the problems of 
information asymmetry (Madiès, 2009a and b).
Furthermore, the need to protect depositors is also justi-
fi  ed by the potentially very high costs which would result 
from the loss of their deposits if a bank were to fail. Those 92
costs are passed on to every individual depositor, but the 
losses may also have a considerable impact on private 
consumption, owing to the sudden decline in consumers’ 
wealth, and hence on economic activity as a whole.
1.2  Financial stability
To ensure an efficient banking system, it is necessary 
to create a climate of confidence and thus avoid panic 
responses which could destabilise the financial system as 
a whole. Creation of such a climate of confidence there-
fore contributes towards maintaining the stability of the 
financial system, essential for its smooth operation.
A lack of confidence can trigger chain reactions lead-
ing to the failure of banking institutions which are, in 
principle, solvent and sound. A run on the banks may be 
precipitated by ill-informed or misinformed depositors, 
unable to distinguish between negative information con-
cerning the sector as a whole and the situation of their 
own bank. A panic response is generally based on self-
fulfilling behaviour by savers, all anticipating large-scale 
withdrawals by other depositors and rushing to recover 
their deposits. Since the value of the bank’s assets in the 
event of compulsory, early liquidation will be less than the 
amount of the deposits, the bank may be perfectly sound 
(or solvent) yet driven to fail by a bank run (Diamond and 
Dybvig, 1983).
A deposit guarantee scheme limits the degree to which 
problems inherent in a particular bank are transferred to 
other healthier banks, since it guarantees depositors com-
pensation if their bank fails, so that they do not need to 
rush to the bank to recover their assets. This mechanism 
therefore reduces the likelihood of a chain reaction and 
contagion of the entire banking system.
However, deposit guarantee schemes are only one of 
the instruments intended to ensure financial stability. 
They are part of a broader financial safety net. There is a 
consensus that such a safety net should comprise deposit 
protection, prudential supervision and regulation, and a 
lender of last resort  (1).
First of all, ex ante crisis prevention measures such as 
effective prudential supervision and a coherent regulatory 
framework should afford protection against bank failures. 
The sector itself must also accept its responsibility and 
control the risks by rigorous internal risk management.
In regard to ex post measures to resolve a crisis, the 
central bank can extend the provision of liquidity for the 
banks when they face financing problems, if need be by 
resorting to unconventional measures as it did during the 
recent crisis. These can be viewed as the operations of 
a lender of last resort, in that most of the banks were 
no longer able to raise finance in the usual way on the 
interbank market. Finally, the fiscal authorities can inter-
vene to restore the solvency of the banks by acquiring a 
share in their capital or by standing guarantor for their 
financial obligations. Unlike the explicit insurance offered 
by deposit guarantee schemes, these actions by central 
banks and authorities constitute an implicit insurance 
of intervention in a crisis  : the action will be discretion-
ary and will often benefit all creditors, and not just the 
depositors.
2.  Core principles for an optimal 
deposit guarantee scheme
2.1  Advantages and disadvantages
Taking account of their objectives, deposit guarantee 
schemes have certain theoretical advantages and disad-
vantages. After discussing them, we shall examine the 
conditions which an effective guarantee scheme must 
fulfil in order to overcome the disadvantages as far as 
possible in practice. The authorities in fact have a choice 
of several regimes which differ in terms of coverage, 
funding and administrative rules  (2).
aDvantages
First, there are several advantages to be gained by pro-
tecting depositors’ savings.
As a result of deposit protection, the financial wealth of 
households is largely safeguarded in times of crisis. That 
prevents the occurrence of decidedly negative wealth 
effects on private consumption, which could drive the real 
economy and the financial sector into a destructive spiral.
Moreover, individuals can more or less disregard the risk of 
failure when choosing their bank. That therefore reduces 
the customer’s information costs, making it easy to seek 
out the institution offering the highest rates. That situa-
tion may increase competition between banks, though on 
average the banks should be able to reduce the amount 
of their deposit remuneration. In a regime where deposits 
(1)  Cf. in particular FSF (2001) and Schich (2008b). The lender of last resort can 
be defined as an institution, usually the central bank, which grants loans to 
the banking sector when all other means at its disposal for obtaining credit 
have been exhausted. According to the classical definition, the aim of the 
lender of last resort is to avoid unnecessary bank failures by enabling the 
banks to overcome their temporary liquidity problems by granting loans at an 
appropriate interest rate against the necessary collateral.
(2)  Cf. in particular Garcia (2000) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005).93
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are not guaranteed, savers in fact demand an additional 
risk premium which depends on the credit institution’s 
– often difficult to estimate – risk of default.
Deposit guarantee schemes also offer a number of sig-
nificant advantages for financial stability, primarily in 
comparison with implicit guarantees.
Unlike implicit guarantees which, by rescuing the financial 
institution, provide a “blank cheque” for all the creditors, 
shareholders and even managers, the protection offered 
by deposit guarantee schemes is confined to depositors. 
It is therefore in the interests of the uninsured parties to 
assess the bank’s risk positions since, in the event of fail-
ure, they will not enjoy the same security as depositors. 
A deposit guarantee scheme may therefore encourage 
better market-based risk monitoring on the part of the 
players best placed to achieve that (institutional investors 
and shareholders).
Another advantage is the creation of a level playing 
field which eliminates the competitive disadvantage of 
small banks. Since they are not regarded as systemically 
important and their survival is not essential to the func-
tioning of the economy, they may be at a disadvantage 
compared to systemically important banks when it comes 
to a rescue operation. During the crisis, it did in fact 
become apparent that a number of large banks received 
assistance on the basis of implicit principles such as “too-
big-to-fail” or variants such as “too-interconnected-to-
fail” or “too-complex-to-fail”. That may have given savers 
the impression that their savings were better protected 
in those large institutions. A deposit guarantee fund 
eliminates that misconception and ensures that deposits 
are guaranteed in all banks, so that the smaller ones do 
not need to offer higher rates in order to attract deposits.
Finally, since most depositors enjoy full protection, deposit 
guarantee schemes make it politically more acceptable for 
governments to decide to allow an institution to fail. They 
thus avoid being forced to rescue all institutions, even 
insolvent ones, via implicit guarantees so that depositors 
do not suffer losses. Apart from the considerable impact 
on the budget often involved in such implicit guarantees, 
they may lead to the maintenance of a weak financial 
system.
DisaDvantages
An important risk often associated with deposit guarantee 
schemes, but also with the lender of last resort and other 
implicit guarantees, is the risk of moral hazard. This con-
cept refers to the changes in the behaviour of insured per-
sons, causing them to take greater risks than they would 
without insurance. Such behaviour could be adopted by 
both banks and depositors, knowing that there is the 
explicit or implicit certainty of government intervention 
at times of distress in the financial sector. When choos-
ing their bank, depositors would no longer attach any 
importance to the soundness of the institution but would 
seek out the highest interest rates. Also, bankers would 
be tempted to make risky investments, on the assumption 
that neither they nor their customers would have to bear 
any losses. The provision of guarantees for savers and 
financial institutions may therefore have the opposite of 
the desired effect and result in a riskier financial system.
2.2  Core principles of the optimal system
Listing the advantages and disadvantages shows that the 
design of a deposit guarantee scheme entails a trade-off 
between the objectives, namely depositor protection and 
financial stability. Giving too much deposit protection 
increases the risk of moral hazard, whereas an inadequate 
level of protection undermines confidence in the system. 
It is therefore necessary to limit the risk of moral hazard 
without endangering the system’s credibility. Moreover, 
the creation of the system must be considered in the 
broader context of the financial safety net of which it 
forms part, and in the international context. Coordination 
and harmonisation are key elements here.
creDibility
The deposit guarantee scheme must be credible in the 
eyes of savers. It cannot be effective unless the guaran-
tees offer a sufficiently high level of cover to apply to the 
bulk of the deposits. Also, depositors must be convinced 
that, after a bank fails, the system will actually be able to 
repay their deposits within a reasonable period of time. 
If the fund is undercapitalised ex ante by the financial 
sector, and/or if the government has insufficient fiscal 
scope to finance intervention ex post, the system will 
lack credibility so that it would still be rational for deposi-
tors to start a bank run. An effective deposit guarantee 
scheme should also preferably be transparent, simple and 
publicised.
limitation oF moral hazarD
There are various ways of limiting moral hazard. In regard 
to coverage, it is possible to exclude some large creditors 
such as financial institutions and institutional investors. It 
will then be very much in the interests of those players 
to monitor the risk-taking behaviour of their bank (Gropp 
and Vesala, 2004). Moreover, unlike small depositors they 
are in the best position to do that.94
Another possibility is the introduction of co-insurance, 
which limits the cover to a fixed percentage (e.g. 90  %) 
of the amount of each individual deposit. That solution 
would help to encourage depositors to adopt a critical 
attitude when choosing their institution. However, it does 
have the disadvantage of causing all depositors to suffer 
a loss in the event of a failure, substantially increasing the 
risk of a bank run, as became apparent at the time of the 
crisis in the United Kingdom (Ondo-Ndong and Scialom, 
2008). In 2009, Directive 2009/14/EC abolished the co-
insurance option.
A third solution to the problem of moral hazard consists 
in financing the deposit insurance fund by a system of 
risk-based contributions. This entails methods of levying 
contributions from financial institutions according to their 
risk profile. The price tag attached to the risk will restrain 
the risk-taking behaviour of financial institutions. The 
drawback of this method is the difficulty of determining 
the risk profile of the institutions. Thus, balance sheet 
data are one possible basis, but they provide little indica-
tion of the future  ; market information is another pos-
sibility, but it is not always available and may be biased. 
Moreover, there are various types of risks, such as market 
risks, credit risks, operational risks and systemic risks, 
which are difficult to combine in a single figure. In that 
regard, the bank regulator seems the most appropriate 
information source.
Finally, the problem of moral hazard can be limited by 
imposing restrictions on the banks, e.g. in the form of 
liquidity and solvency requirements  : that is the task of 
prudential regulation and supervision. In that regard, one 
form of regulation necessitates the other (Greenspan, 
2001).
national anD international coorDination
The above example shows that deposit guarantee schemes 
cannot be viewed separately from other arrangements for 
the prevention and resolution of crises forming part of 
the financial safety net, i.e. the prudential supervisory 
authority and regulator, and the lender of last resort. 
Deposit guarantee schemes are in general only activated 
after a bankruptcy, while the other elements of the safety 
net aim to avoid that.
It is essential for these institutions to exchange informa-
tion readily and promptly so that, in a crisis, they can take 
swift, coordinated action (IADI, 2006). The elements of 
the financial safety net in fact interact in various ways. 
First, prudential regulation and supervision limit the 
moral hazard inherent in the deposit guarantee scheme 
and the function of lender of last resort. There are also 
interactions between these last two elements. Thus, the 
deposit guarantee scheme resources may be preserved if 
the lender of last resort supports a struggling financial 
institution. Conversely, such measures may lead to an 
insolvent bank continuing in business, resulting in a con-
stant decline in its capital as a percentage of its depos-
its  (1), potentially encouraging a bank run. On the other 
hand, a quick failure favours prompt compensation by 
the guarantee fund. These examples show that uncoor-
dinated intervention may endanger financial stability and 
thus entail high social costs.
The global character of the modern financial system 
creates additional problems. If an international financial 
institution gets into difficulty, numerous public authorities 
are involved. It is therefore vital to optimise the coordina-
tion and exchange of information between countries and 
between deposit guarantee schemes. However, during 
the crisis, it became apparent that national interests took 
precedence in the absence of instructions specifying what 
must be communicated and by whom. That led to great 
uncertainty for the customers of savings institutions, e.g. 
in the case of the Belgian branches of the Luxembourg 
company Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg S.A., itself a sub-
sidiary of the failed Icelandic bank Kaupthing.
One of the problems that arises is the home/host issue. 
It concerns the division of powers between national 
authorities. In the EEA  (2) (which comprises the EU, 
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein), subsidiaries of foreign 
banks come under the guarantee fund of the country in 
which they are established (host control). Conversely, the 
deposits in branches  (3) of foreign banks are covered by 
the guarantee fund of the country where the bank has its 
head office (home control)  (4).
These rules are not very transparent for depositors (5). They 
make it difficult for them to choose an institution since 
they need to know its legal form and origin, as well as 
the characteristics and reliability of the associated deposit 
guarantee scheme.
(1)  Schich (2008a) states in this connection that in exchange for the loan the 
lender of last resort takes good collateral from the bank, constantly reducing 
the good quality assets available to depositors and other creditors. However, 
that statement was less relevant during the recent crisis, since the collateral 
accepted for the provision of liquidity by the central banks was extended to 
include lower quality instruments, subject to deduction of a certain percentage 
(haircut).
(2)  European Economic Area. For banks not in the EEA, Member States are free to 
devise regulations. In Belgium, all those banks (branches or subsidiaries) come 
under the Belgian guarantee fund.
(3)  Any subsidiary of a foreign bank that is established in Belgium is regarded as a 
firm incorporated under Belgian law that is legally independent from the parent 
company, while a bank branch is not a separate legal body ; it is just a normal 
decentralised structure of the foreign company.
(4)  However, branches of foreign banks may opt for additional participation in the 
guarantee fund of the country where they are established, if that offers higher 
coverage than the guarantee scheme of their country of origin.
(5)  Thus, it eventually emerged that the deposits of Belgian customers of 
Kaupthing were covered by the Luxembourg guarantee fund, while the 
deposits of customers of Kaupthing in the Netherlands were covered by the 
Icelandic guarantee fund, since the bank operated there as a branch of the 
Icelandic parent institution.95
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From the banks’ point of view, the differences between 
guarantee schemes may distort competition. Thus, the 
banks operating under a favourable system – in regard 
to both contributions and coverage – can attract more 
deposits at lower cost. The parent institutions can also 
convert their branches into subsidiaries (or vice versa), to 
shop for the best regulation offering the most attractive 
guarantee at the lowest price. Conversion of a branch 
into a subsidiary has the effect that its deposits are imme-
diately covered by the guarantee fund of the country in 
which it operates, even though it has never contributed 
to that fund in the past. The differences may also give rise 
to abuse. Banks which take high risks may take advantage 
of a lack of transparency and thus attract deposits via 
branches based in countries offering a high guarantee. 
Against that backdrop, they may benefit from the lack 
of information for local depositors who might wrongly 
assume that their deposits come under the favour-
able local guarantee system. Moreover, the policy of the 
parent bank is not supervised by the regulatory authori-
ties of the country in which the branch is established. 
That situation may lead to inadequate information on the 
risk-taking behaviour of the branch.
Clear rules or harmonised systems – particularly in regard 
to the level of coverage and funding – are therefore neces-
sary to prevent differences between national guarantee 
schemes from giving rise to distortions of competition, 
abuses and uncertainty, and hampering financial integra-
tion (Trichet, 2008). International cooperation is necessary 
here. Pending harmonisation of the national systems within 
the EU, or even the creation of a pan-European deposit 
guarantee scheme, some countries have already confirmed 
their collaboration in a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) which may be concluded at bilateral or multilateral 
level. That cooperation concerns the exchange of informa-
tion and the treatment of applications for compensation. 
MoUs are particularly important where branches opt for 
complementary participation in the guarantee scheme of 
the country where they are established. So far, the Belgian 
deposit guarantee scheme has concluded two MoUs, one 
with the British system (Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme) and the other with the Dutch system managed by 
the Nederlandsche Bank.
3.  Characteristics




In accordance with the European Directives 94/19 and 
97/9, two schemes have been set up in Belgium : a deposit 
guarantee scheme and a financial instrument protection 
system.
In Belgium, the deposit guarantee currently amounts to 
€  100,000 per depositor and per financial institution. 
The decision to raise the previous ceiling of €  20,000 
was taken by the federal government, by a Royal Decree 
published in the Moniteur belge of 17 November 2008, 
in the wake of the financial crisis. As in other European 
countries, confidence in the financial system was shaken 
and the first signs of deposit withdrawal were appearing. 
The aim was to curb the loss of confidence.
Deposit protection applies to all credit balances denomi-
nated in an EEA currency and held by natural persons, 
associations and small or medium-sized firms  (2) in the 
form of current accounts, term accounts and savings 
accounts with a financial institution. It also covers funds 
on an investor’s account and debt instruments issued by 
credit institutions (such as savings notes and bonds) if 
they are registered, dematerialised or held in a securities 
account. Bearer savings notes are not protected.
The protection of life insurance contracts  (3) only covers 
class 21 products offering a guaranteed return, provided 
they are bought from a company which has elected 
to join the system (membership is currently voluntary). 
The reason for extending coverage to these products is 
that, despite taking the form of an insurance contract, 
these products are intended to attract the same group 
of depositors as those interested in conventional savings 
products offered by credit institutions (Debremaeker, 
2009). As soon as an insurance undertaking joins the 
system, its customers enjoy a guarantee equal to the 
redemption value of their life insurance contracts on the 
day before the date on which the insurance undertaking 
fails, subject to a maximum of € 100,000.
The protection of financial instruments applies to all 
securities (shares, bonds, UCIs) issued by a third party 
and held on behalf of customers with a credit institution 
or investment firm, if that institution is unable to deliver 
or return them.
(1)  Only the most important characteristics of the Belgian guarantee scheme are 
considered here. For more detailed information, we refer to the most recent 
activity report of the Deposit and Financial Instrument Protection Fund, a public 
institution managing the scheme.
(2)  Firms allowed to draw up an abridged balance sheet are covered by the 
protection system guarantee. Large and medium-sized firms which have to file 
a full-format balance sheet are therefore excluded. In practice, these are firms 
which either have an annual average number of employees in excess of 100, 
or which exceed more than one of the following criteria : a balance sheet total 
of € 3,650,000, an annual turnover (excluding VAT) of € 7,300,000, and an 
average number of employees totalling 50 persons.
(3)  This protection was primarily a response by the Belgian government to the 
problems facing Ethias in the context of the financial crisis. It is now also an 
item on the European agenda. In 2008, the European Commission conducted 
a consultation on this subject, and will draw up a proposal for a Directive on 
protection for insurance products in 2011.96
Intervention by the Protection Fund will therefore be 
necessary only in exceptional cases in which the securities 
held by the failed institution have been returned to their 
owners, but some owners have not recovered the whole 
of their securities. The amount of the guarantee covering 
financial instruments has been kept at € 20,000  (1).
Since the protection is intended mainly for ordinary 
savers, some categories – generally referred to as pro-
fessional players – do not qualify for intervention. This 
applies to governments and government agencies, finan-
cial institutions, institutional investors, large firms and 
persons connected in various ways with the failed institu-
tion or undertaking (executive and supervisory directors, 
associate companies) or persons whose behaviour has 
contributed to the failure.
3.1.2  Effective coverage
Various statistics are used to try to estimate the extent 
to which the bank deposits of Belgian households and 
firms are covered by the deposit guarantee. Thus, the 
data supplied by Febelfin – the Belgian financial sector 
federation – on the number of accounts held by house-
holds and firms with banks established in Belgium were 
combined with the statistics on the amounts of deposits 
held with Belgian banks, compiled by the Bank in draw-
ing up Belgium’s financial accounts. These two sources 
permit an estimate of the average amount of current 
account deposits, term deposits and savings deposits held 
by resident firms and households.
Households’ current account deposits total an average of 
€ 3,240, if the analysis is confined to those with a credit 
balance. The number of accounts comes to 11 million, 
representing an average of 1.1 accounts per person.
Households’ term deposits have an average balance of 
almost €  25,000. However, the number of accounts is 
relatively small at just under 900,000. In other words, 
only one in ten residents has a term account.
Finally, households hold on average somewhat more 
than € 10,000 in a regulated savings account. There are 
over 18 million accounts of this type, a figure well in 
excess of the Belgian population, indicating that some 
savers hold more than one savings account. Apart from 
‘shopping around’, one reason for opening multiple 
  savings accounts is that savers want to avoid exceeding 
the maximum limit on interest exempt from withholding 
tax.
The table below offers a brief estimate of the sums 
involved. Various factors make it impossible to refine the 
results. First, the financial accounts break down the data 
into euros and other currencies : the other EEA currencies 
cannot be specifically identified. The figures presented 
here therefore take no account of deposits held in EEA 
currencies other than the euro. Also, the data include 
euro deposits held by individuals with branches of foreign 
banks for which the guarantee is provided by another 
Member State.
Moreover, these average values give no idea of the 
breakdown of the balances of the deposits among 
savers. The Eurosystem survey of the financial behaviour 
of households, first conducted in Belgium in the summer 
of 2010, should provide totally new information on the 
breakdown of the real and financial assets of savers. 
(1)  In July 2010, the European Commission however also put forward a proposal 
for a new Directive concerning compensation schemes for investors whereby 
the coverage would be increased to € 50,000.
Table  1  Euro dEposits hEld by housEholds with banks EstablishEd in bElgium
 
Total amount of  
deposits  (1)
Number of  
accounts  (2)
Average amount  
per account
Average number of  
accounts per person












Current accounts  (3)  .................. 36,907 11,390 3,240 1.1 3,415
Term accounts  ...................... 21,110 861 24,514 0.1 1,953
Regulated savings accounts  ........... 186,294 18,352 10,151 1.7 17,238
  total  ..............................   244,311   30,604   7,983   2.8   22,606
Sources : DGSEI, Febelfin, NBB.
(1)  As at 30 June 2010.
(2)  As at 31 December 2009.
(3)  With a credit balance.
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Based on a survey of 2,000 households, the findings can 
be extrapolated to the population as a whole, but will not 
be available before the end of 2011.
The averages thus calculated, though imperfect, are nev-
ertheless valuable for estimating the appropriateness of 
the ceiling on the deposit guarantee scheme applicable in 
Belgium. For ease of analysis, we shall concentrate on the 
assets of individuals, ignoring two categories of financial 
instruments  : any savings notes and other fixed-income 
securities issued by the failed institution which, if they are 
not bearer instruments, are normally added to the saver’s 
deposits, and the outstanding balance due on any loans 
contracted with the failed institution, which is deducted 
from the amount of the deposits.
On average, Belgian residents hold about € 22,500 each 
in bank deposits, either held with one bank or spread 
over a number of banks, in 1.1 current accounts, 1.7 
savings accounts and 0.1 term accounts, i.e. an average 
of 2.8 accounts. Of course, household deposits are not 
evenly distributed. Some people hold less than € 22,500 
in bank deposits, or even do not have a bank account, 
while others have accounts with a much bigger balance.
Taking account of these inequalities, a fundamental ques-
tion is whether or not the distribution of the amounts 
of the deposits is symmetrical around the average. If it 
is, the median deposit per person would be equivalent 
to the average deposit, namely €  22,500. In that case, 
around 50  % of the population did not enjoy full protec-
tion against a bank failure when the old ceiling applied. 
However, in practice it seems that, in so far as they 
reflect the distribution of total assets, deposits display an 
asymmetric pattern. In particular, a minority of persons 
apparently hold substantial deposits, driving up the aver-
age. In that case, the median deposit is less than the 
average of € 22,500. That means that more than 50  % 
of people already enjoyed full protection of their deposits 
before the ceiling was increased. The opposite side of 
the coin is that a proportion of savers – under 50 %, but 
presumably a significant percentage – nevertheless held 
total bank deposits of more than € 20,000 at that time. 
From now on they enjoy increased protection, or even full 
protection in some cases, with an intervention ceiling of 
€ 100,000.
These assumptions are consistent with the European 
Commission’s estimate, which – on the basis of the 
coverage rate calculated in the Member States offering 
comparable protection – considers that 67  % of eligible 
deposits in Belgium were completely covered when the 
ceiling was still set at € 20,000. For the new arrangement, 
the Commission estimated that in July 2010 about 95  % 
of the eligible deposits were completely covered by a ceil-
ing of € 100,000 (EC, 2010d).
Ultimately, only the minority of savers whose total 
bank deposits exceed the current ceiling will potentially 
incur losses if a bank fails, and then only if that ceiling 
is reached in the case of one and the same institution. 
However, some savers are likely to spread their deposits 
over accounts with a number of different institutions.
Where businesses are concerned, current accounts (with 
a credit balance) have a total balance averaging around 
€ 50,000 each. There are almost 1 million such accounts, 
representing 3.2 accounts per firm. Each firm there-
fore has an average of € 157,000 on deposit in current 
accounts.
Table  2  Euro dEposits of firms  (1) hEld with banks EstablishEd in bElgium
 
Total amount of  
deposits  (2)
Number of  
accounts  (3)
Average amount  
per account
Average number of  
accounts per firm












Current accounts  (4)  .................. 46,943 945 49,672 3.2 156,920
Term accounts  ...................... 18,733 32 581,130 0.1 62,619
Savings accounts  .................... 12,815 375 34,180 1.3 42,837
  total  ..............................   78,490   1,352   58,046   4.5   262,376
Sources : Febelfin, NBB.
(1)  Based on the number of non-financial firms which deposit an annual account at the Central Balance Sheet Office in 2008.
(2)  As at 30 June 2010.
(3)  As at 31 December 2009.
(4)  With a credit balance.
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The term deposits of firms have an average balance of 
around €  580,000. As in the case of households, they 
are very few in number : only one in ten firms has a term 
account. Per firm, the average balance on term accounts 
comes to € 63,000.
Finally, savings accounts held by firms contain on average 
€ 34,000. There are around 375,000 of these accounts, 
or 1.3 per firm. Consequently, each firm has an average 
of € 43,000 on a savings account.
With the provisos expressed above, each firm based in 
Belgium has bank deposits with one or more resident 
credit institutions containing a total equivalent to around 
€ 262,000, divided among 4.5 accounts, namely 3.2 cur-
rent accounts, 0.1 term accounts and 1.3 savings accounts. 
As in the case of households, the sums recorded are most 
likely divided unevenly among firms according to their 
size and sector of activity. In particular, it can be assumed 
that the deposits of small and medium-sized firms are in 
most cases smaller on average, while those of large firms 
– which represent only a small proportion of non-financial 
corporations (5.9 % in 2008) – are much larger.
At present, only the deposits of small and medium-
sized firms which have filed accounts in the abbreviated 
format are covered by the Belgian deposit guarantee 
scheme. In the absence of data on the breakdown of 
the amounts of deposits by firm size, it is impossible 
to state exactly what amounts are guaranteed by the 
current deposit protection system and what proportion 
of SME deposits are covered. Anyway, in the future, the 
distinction by size of the firms will no longer be relevant 
as the European Commission proposes that all firms 
regardless of their size, will be covered by the deposit 
guarantee scheme.
Firms are more likely than individuals to use the services 
of several banks, making them less vulnerable to the fail-
ure of one individual bank. Nevertheless, the guarantee 
scheme will cover their assets to a lesser degree than 
those of households. That is certainly true in the case of 
large firms. Moral hazard will be less of a factor in their 
case, since losses remain possible. They will therefore 
have to take account of the risk profile of their banks. 
For individuals and probably SMEs, on the other hand, 
the coverage is virtually complete and the profile of the 
chosen bank will probably be disregarded.
3.2  Financing
The guarantee scheme covering deposits and financial 
instruments is financed ex ante by members’ contributions.
3.2.1  Members
Membership of the protection scheme is compulsory for 
credit institutions, investment firms and stock  broking 
firms incorporated under Belgian law, and is a pre- 
condition for obtaining the approval of the Banking, 
Finance and Insurance Commission (CBFA). Coverage is 
compulsory not only for the assets of Belgian banks in 
Belgium but also for the assets held by their branches in 
the EEA.
Branches of institutions governed by the law of another 
EEA Member State active in Belgium come under the 
protection scheme established in their country of origin, 
in accordance with the European Directives.
Branches of credit institutions and investment firms estab-
lished in Belgium and governed by the law of a country 
which is not a member of the EEA have to join the pro-
tection scheme if their liabilities are not covered by an 
equivalent protection scheme in their country of origin.
In contrast to the above institutions, which are obliged 
to take part in the system of protection for deposits and 
financial instruments, insurance companies participate on 
a voluntary basis in the guarantee scheme covering insur-
ance contracts.
3.2.2  Funds
The financing of the liabilities relating to deposit pro-
tection is divided in Belgium between two funds  : the 
Protection Fund for Deposits and Financial Instruments 
and the Special Protection Fund for Deposits and Life 
Insurance.
The Protection Fund for Deposits and Financial Instruments 
(hereinafter  : the Protection Fund) is based on the 
European Union requirements concerning the protec-
tion of deposits and savings notes, and is responsible 
for financing the first € 50,000 tranche of each deposit 
and the whole of the intervention in the case of financial 
instruments, the latter still being capped at € 20,000. The 
Protection Fund is an autonomous public institution with 
its own legal personality. It is administered by a board of 
directors comprising equal numbers of representatives of 
the financial sector and the government.
Any intervention concerning the balance of deposits in 
excess of €  50,000 is the responsibility of the Special 
Protection Fund for Deposits and Life Insurance (herein-
after : the Special Fund), newly formed in 2008 following 
the extension of the guarantee. This internal financing 
system is neutral for depositors, who can claim the 99
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guarantee of € 100,000 under any circumstances. As its 
name indicates, the Special Protection Fund for Deposits 
and Life Insurance also administers the new guarantee 
covering class 21 life insurance products. That guarantee 
is totally independent of the bank deposit guarantee, 
and is administered entirely and exclusively by the Special 
Fund. The Special Fund is run by the Caisse des dépôts et 
consignations, which comes under FPS Finance.
With effect from 1 January 2011, however, this system 
will undergo fundamental change. From that date, the 
Special Fund will provide protection for all life insurance 
products with guaranteed return coming under class 21, 
for which participation will be compulsory, up to the 
maximum of €  100,000. It will take on the protection 
of deposits up to that same ceiling once the scope for 
intervention by the Protection Fund has been exhausted.
3.2.3  Contributions
Up to 31 December 2010, credit institutions and invest-
ment firms are in principle required to make a contribu-
tion which is divided into four parts :
–   in regard to deposits eligible for compensation :
  –   a contribution of 0.175  ‰ payable to the Protection 
Fund, and
  –    a contribution of 0.31 ‰ payable to the Special Fund ;
–   in regard to the protection of financial instruments :
  –    a contribution of 0.7 % (capped at € 154,000) of the 
gross profits for the previous year excluding interest 
income (for the credit institutions) or the turnover 
(for stockbroking firms) payable to the Protection 
Fund, and
  –   a contribution of 0.01  ‰ (capped at € 455,000) of 
the outstanding total of financial instruments held 
for the account of third parties, also payable to the 
Protection Fund.
The insurance companies wishing to join the guarantee 
system for life insurances must also pay financial contribu-
tions to the Special Fund :
–   a one-off initial contribution of 0.25 % and
–   an annual contribution of 0.50 ‰.
These two contributions are calculated on the total inven-
toried reserves of the protected life insurance contracts.
It was necessary to step up the system’s financing taking 
into account the increase of the guarantees. At the end 
of 2009, the intervention resources of the Protection 
Fund came to €  879 million. Taking account of the 
€ 244   billion held on household bank accounts at the end 
of June 2010, we can estimate that around 0.36 % of the 
guaranteed amounts are covered by the current financial 
resources of the Protection Fund, even disregarding the 
deposits covered for SMEs.
Therefore, as foreseen in the Programme Law of 
23 December 2009, member banks and investment 
firms will pay in two equal instalments, one in December 
2010 and the other in January 2011, a membership fee 
of 0.10  % of the total amount of their deposits as at 
30 September 2010. Their annual contribution to the 
Special Fund will also be increased, from 2011, to 0.15 % 
of their eligible deposits valued as at 30 September in the 
year preceding the payment.
Similarly, insurance companies will be obliged to join the 
Special Fund and pay an annual contribution equivalent to 
0.15  % of the value of the protected contracts (class 21 
products) as at 30 September in the previous year.
3.3  Payout delay
Under the current system, payouts must be made within a 
maximum of three months following the date of default. 
That period may be extended three times by a maximum 
of 3 months at a time, on the decision of the CBFA and in 
exceptional circumstances.
4.  Recommendations issued by the 
European Commission since the crisis 
and challenges ahead
Since 1994, national deposit guarantee schemes in the EU 
have been addressed by a European Directive (EC, 1994). 
Up until the crisis, the EU had opted for limited har-
monisation, pursuant to Directive 94/19/EC on deposit 
guarantee schemes, by essentially only setting a minimum 
level of the guarantee (€  20,000  (1)). Consequently, the 
national authorities were free to decide the form taken by 
their deposit guarantee scheme, taking account of their 
financial structure and the scope available. That led to 
significant fragmentation since there are currently around 
forty  (2) deposit guarantee schemes in the EU, with differ-
ing coverage, financing and administrative rules.
(1)  In 1994, the Directive set a transitional implementation period expiring on 
31 December 1999, and made provision for the possibility of reviewing the 
amount of the coverage every five years from 2005 onwards. Although the 
Commission conducted an analysis on the subject in 2006, the amount of 
coverage remained unchanged until 2009 at EU level.
(2)  In some countries, multiple systems were devised in response to the diversity 
of the financial landscape (e.g. commercial banks versus savings banks in 
Germany).100
4.1  Directive 2009/14/EC as a rapid response to the 
crisis
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 demonstrated that 
some deposit guarantee schemes in the EU were unable 
to preserve depositors’ confidence and financial stability, 
as is evident from the bank run on Northern Rock at the 
start of the crisis in September 2007 and the increased 
nervousness among depositors in general. The guaran-
tees offered proved insufficient in a good many cases. 
Moreover, the differences between guarantee schemes 
sometimes led to deposits being transferred to institutions 
covered by a more favourable deposit guarantee scheme, 
causing serious disruption for both banks and depositors 
and negating the benefits of the single European market.
In October 2008, on the initiative of the European 
finance ministers, the European Commission produced a 
rapid response to the crisis in proposing a new Directive 
2009/14/EC. However, that Directive  (1), in force since 
11 March 2009, was an emergency measure intended 
mainly to restore the confidence of depositors, and dealt 
only with issues that could be changed relatively quickly :
–    the immediate increase in the minimum guarantee from 
€ 20,000 to € 50,000 before July 2009 and the intro-
duction of a fixed guaranteed amount of € 100,000 in 
all Member States by the end of 2010 ;
–    the reduction in the payout delay – by no later than the 
end of 2010 – from three months to 20 working days, 
with a possible extension of no more than 10 working 
days under exceptional circumstances ;
–   the abolition of the co-insurance clauses which cause 
depositors to incur a loss if their financial institution 
fails ;
–   the establishment of a duty on financial institutions to 
provide information so that depositors know whether, 
and to what extent, their deposits are covered by a 
guarantee scheme.
However, in the long run, this Directive explicitly aimed at 
in-depth review of the deposit guarantee schemes once 
an impact analysis has been conducted. It also makes 
provision for examining in that connection whether the 
new coverage set at € 100,000 is optimal.
4.2  Proposal of 12 July 2010 for a new European 
Directive on deposit guarantee schemes
On 12 July 2010, after having conducted an impact 
analysis and consulted various interest groups (consum-
ers, banks, deposit guarantee funds, Member States, 
central banks  (2)), the European Commission published its 
proposal for new rules on deposit guarantee schemes 
(EC, 2010c)  (3). Note that before that proposal becomes a 
Directive, it has to be approved, with or without amend-
ments, by the European Parliament and the Council.
Apart from offering better coverage for consumers, the 
Commission proposal essentially provides for harmonisa-
tion of the schemes in regard to both the guarantees 
offered and their financing, in order to create a level 
playing field between the Member States and thus pro-
mote financial integration in the EU. The Commission 
also wants to enhance the effectiveness and credibility 
of the schemes by simplifying their administrative rules 
and guaranteeing them sounder financing, which would 
also help to restrain any risk-taking behaviour by financial 
institutions.
In view of the complexity of the schemes in terms of both 
their economic impact and their legal ramifications, the 
Commission proposal provides for a very gradual transi-
tion for some measures, while others will enter into force 
immediately from 2013 onwards. The new rules in the 
proposal for a Directive apply to all banks established in 
the EU, and can be summarised as follows.
4.2.1  Unified coverage and scope
The proposal reiterates the increase in coverage to a fixed 
amount of € 100,000 in all Member States by the end 
of 2010.
In many cases, the introduction of this new uniform level 
offers consumers clearer, more effective protection and 
will probably contribute to the further integration of 
banking activities in the EU. At present, the coverage still 
varies widely from one Member State to another, rang-
ing from a minimum of € 50,000 in some East European 
countries to € 103,000 in Italy.
In comparison with the coverage applicable before the 
financial crisis, the number of deposits with total cover in 
the EU should increase from 89 to 95 % of eligible depos-
its, while the amount covered will rise from 61 to 72 % of 
these deposits. There would probably be little advantage 
in higher coverage  : according to the Commission, cover-
age of € 200,000 would boost the number of deposits 
with full cover by less than 2  %, and would not justify 
the costs (financing) and disadvantages (moral hazard) 
entailed in such an increase (EC, 2010d).
(1)  Directive 2009/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee schemes as regards the coverage level 
and the payout delay (EC, 2009b).
(2)  For the Eurosystem’s position, cf. ECB (2009).
(3)  It forms part of a broader set of reforms which are also aimed at investment 
protection and the protection of insurance products.101
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The cover would apply to all individuals, all firms and all 
currencies. It excludes deposits by local authorities and 
financial institutions, debt certificates and structured 
investment products. For simplicity, large firms would no 
longer be excluded, as the costs and disadvantages asso-
ciated with the identification of large firms would cause 
significant delays in payouts to depositors.
Although the guarantee figure of € 100,000 is a maxi-
mum, Member States may decide to provide temporary 
cover in excess of that limit in the case of deposits result-
ing from real estate transactions or specific events (such 
as retirement), provided that this provision remains valid 
for no longer than twelve months.
4.2.2  Faster payouts
According to the proposal, the payout delay should be 
cut to seven working days. That is considerably shorter 
than the payout delays seen during the crisis, which 
sometimes amounted to several months (as in the case of 
Kaupthing). A number of pre-conditions are necessary for 
this speedier payout.
First, the prudential supervision authorities would need to 
inform the deposit guarantee scheme operators promptly 
if a bank is likely to fail. Next, the guarantee fund would 
have to be able to identify quickly the deposits to be 
repaid on the basis of the information held by the credit 
institutions. More particularly, the latter must be able to 
supply information on the total amount of the deposits 
held by a depositor (“single customer view”). To guaran-
tee this prompt payout in the event of an international 
institution’s failure, it is specified that the deposit guar-
antee scheme of the country in which the bank operates 
(host) should act as the contact point.
By further reducing the payout delay, the Commission 
aims to augment the credibility of the guarantee schemes 
and prevent depositors’ financial resources from being 
blocked for too long, as that would force them to cut 
back their consumption. However, a prompt payout also 
entails risks, particularly the risk of erroneous payouts, 
imposing particularly heavy demands on the administra-
tion of both credit institutions and guarantee funds.
4.2.3    Risk-weighted financing in a new, credible 
financing model
During the crisis, it became apparent that a number of 
systems had inadequate funding to cope with the fail-
ure of a large bank. Thus, the Icelandic guarantee fund 
did not have sufficient resources to recompense the 
depositors of the foreign branches of Landsbanki (better 
known as Icesave) and Kaupthing Bank in Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
Up to now, the Member States have been free to organ-
ise the financing of the guarantee funds, which is why 
there are major differences between funds. However, the 
general principle is that the final cost of intervention is 
borne by the credit institutions. Traditionally, a distinction 
is made between ex ante and ex post financing. Under 
the ex ante system, the resources are paid into the fund 
in advance on a regular basis by the financial sector, while 
in the ex post system the funds do not ask for the neces-
sary resources until a claim arises, and are paid by either 
the financial sector or by the government which advances 
the amounts for the financial sector. There are only six 
countries where contributions are received solely ex post 
(Austria, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia and 
the United Kingdom). In most schemes, the contributions 
represent a fixed percentage of the amount of the eligible 
deposits. Only eight schemes weight the contributions 
according to the risks  (1). Banks with a higher risk profile 
have to pay more, and that helps to reduce the moral 
hazard in the financial sector.
The financing of the funds is crucial to the credibility of 
the deposit guarantee schemes. If a fund does not have 
sufficient resources, it does not perform its role since 
depositors will consider it rational to start a bank run. 
However, the optimum level of funding is hard to deter-
mine, as the contributions may be viewed as a tax on 
the financial sector, depressing its profitability. Since the 
funds have to manage the sums received in a very con-
servative way, the yield is also low. Ideally, the resources 
should reflect the probability of failure on the part of a 
country’s financial institutions. Thus, if the funding level 
is high, that may also suggest that the authorities are 
taking account of a substantial default risk, which may 
dent depositors’ confidence. In 2007, the resources of 
ex ante systems in the EU ranged from 0.01  % (Cyprus) 
to 2.3  % (Lithuania) of eligible deposits. In Belgium, 
according to the Commission’s figures, the funding ratio 
came to 0.33 %. Bearing in mind the lessons of the crisis, 
the Commission decided, in its proposal, to step up the 
financing of deposit guarantee schemes and to make 
the financial sector carry responsibility by introducing 
risk-based funding contributions. These provisions open 
the way to the establishment of a harmonised funding 
system, an essential pre-condition for the possible crea-
tion of a pan-European guarantee fund.
The proposal provides for improved financing of deposit 
guarantee schemes. First, by 2020, the ex ante resources 
(1)  For a description of these systems, cf. EC (2008).102
are to represent 1.5 % of eligible deposits, implying a sig-
nificant increase in funding levels. If the ex ante resources 
are insufficient to cater for the reimbursement of deposi-
tors, the guarantee funds will be able to turn to other 
sources of finance. Those additional sources are made up 
as follows :
–   ex post resources equal to 0.5 % of eligible deposits, so 
that they make up a maximum of 25 % of the resources 
contributed by the financial sector ;
–   loans by other EU guarantee funds (mutual borrowing 
facility), amounting to a maximum of 0.5  % of the 
eligible deposits of the borrower system ;
–   alternative funding arrangements.
In contrast to previous practices, based on a fixed per-
centage of deposits, the ex ante resources would also 
vary partly according to the risk profile of the credit 
institutions. That risk profile would be based on eight 
indicators identifying the main risk areas which concern 
the capital base, asset quality, profitability and liquidity  (1). 
In order to give credit institutions a strong incentive to 
conduct internal risk management, the banks presenting 
the highest risks would have to contribute around three 
times as much as those presenting the lowest risks  (2).
Since intervention by guarantee funds in the EU has 
tended to be an exceptional move, even during the recent 
crisis, it is not possible to establish whether their financing 
is adequate on the basis of the way in which bank failures 
have been handled. The proposal therefore recommends 
regular stress testing to determine the ability of credit 
institutions to honour their commitments promptly during 
a crisis.
4.2.4  Simplification and transparency
By harmonisation and restrictions on exceptions, the 
Commission aims to simplify the regulations overall. The 
combined deposits held by a customer with one financial 
institution in the EU are guaranteed up to € 100,000, and 
– according to the proposal – the customer must have 
access to the guaranteed funds within seven days of the 
date of failure. These rules give depositors a clearer view 
of the operation of the system.
In its proposal, the Commission also abolishes the convo-
luted rules that complicated compensation without offer-
ing any real advantages. Thus, the provision allowing net 
payment – i.e. after deducting account holders’ debt to a 
bank from their savings – would be abolished. Moreover, 
depositors no longer need to complete any formalities 
if a bank fails  ; the payout is effected automatically by 
the national deposit guarantee scheme. Depositors of a 
branch of a cross-border bank would also be reimbursed 
by the guarantee fund of the country where that branch 
is established (host fund). However, that is a purely 
administrative procedure  ; in the end, the amounts paid 
come from the fund of the country of origin.
The proposal also obliges financial institutions to inform 
depositors of the guarantees which they enjoy, both on 
creation of a deposit and on the account statements. 
Also, the deposit guarantee scheme must be transparent 
and help to strengthen the system’s credibility by publish-
ing specific information on the guarantees and how they 
are financed.
4.3  Consequences and challenges
In general, the Commission’s proposal for a Directive 
largely takes account of the core principles concerning 
an optimal system design described in section 2.2 of this 
  article. The proposal offers depositors better and more 
credible protection. Regardless of which bank savers 
choose in the EU, their total deposits are covered by a 
(1)  Defining the risk profile is a complex procedure surrounded by great 
uncertainty. Every method has both advantages and disadvantages. The 
Commission opted for a method based on the balance sheet data and 
comprising several indicators. For a description of the various models taken into 
account in calculating the risk-based contributions, see EC (2009a).
(2)  The risk-based contributions distinguish between financial institutions 
according to their relative risk profile (in comparison with other banks). It 
is therefore more difficult to deal with systemic risks, as an increase in the 
systemic risk will not necessarily result in an increase in the contribution from 
a particular bank, provided the latter’s relative risk position remains unchanged.
chArt 1  FunDing ratio  (1) oF Deposit guarantee 
schemes in the eu  (2)
(percentages, 2007)















(1)  Ex ante resources as a percentage of the total deposits eligible for the 
guarantee.
(2)  Not available for countries without ex ante financing (Austria, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Slovenia and United Kingdom) or for Germany, 
Poland, Portugal and Slovakia.103
thE BElgiAn dEposit guArAntEE schEmE  
in A EuropEAn pErspEctivE
guarantee of € 100,000 per institution and they are to 
have access to those deposits within seven days on the 
basis of increased financing. That enhanced credibility 
reduces the risk of a bank run. Apart from the advantages 
which deposit guarantee schemes already presented in 
relation to implicit guarantees intended to safeguard 
financial stability, the proposal takes particular account of 
moral hazard or the risk-taking that the guarantees could 
encourage. Despite the introduction of risk-based financ-
ing, prudential supervision and regulation, however, still 
has a vital role to play in limiting the risks because, as a 
result of the almost total coverage of deposits, savers are 
likely to respond faster to a rise in interest rates without 
paying attention to the risk profile of their chosen insti-
tution. Finally, the proposal also opens the way to the 
creation of a level playing field in the EU, so that banks 
are no longer confronted by distortions of competition 
resulting from the differences between the national guar-
antee schemes, and that will encourage further financial 
integration.
The impact of the new Directive, if adopted, and its 
implications must also be viewed in perspective against 
the broader range of measures designed to increase 
the resilience of the financial system. Apart from the 
strengthening of the deposit guarantee schemes, the 
prudential framework in the EU has also been modified 
in two ways : first, by the establishment of a new super-
vision set-up comprising three European Supervisory 
Authorities (ESAs)  (1) and a European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB), and second by a proposal to tighten up bank-
ing regulations as regards capital and liquidity require-
ments (Basel III accords  (2)). In addition, various groups 
of experts  (3) are discussing the introduction of a tax on 
the financial sector, and more specifically on systemic 
too-big-to-fail institutions, or on financial transactions. 
Caution is vital here. The consequences of financial 
regulations are often complex. Among other things, 
account must be taken of the interactions between the 
various measures. Thus, the improved coverage offered 
by the guarantee fund cannot be viewed separately from 
tighter prudential control. The measures taken should 
also preferably be coordinated on an international scale 
so that they do not lead to competitive advantages or 
disadvantages which could distort capital movements. 
Finally, excessively strict regulation – e.g. the introduction 
of levies which would also concern deposit guarantee 
schemes – could affect the financial sector’s profitability 
and encourage “shadow banking” activities or innova-
tions which circumvent the regulations, thus threatening 
financial stability. It is therefore important to consider the 
cumulative effects of the reforms in the financial sector 
as they are not necessarily equal to the sum of the indi-
vidual effects.
The proposal for a new Directive is not an end in itself. 
First, the Commission proposes that the new rules should 
be gradually phased in. Second, the Commission will 
assess the impact of the measures and the necessary 
efforts on the basis of interim reports, and consider 
whether it is appropriate to launch longer-term projects.
a pan-european guarantee FunD
The creation of a pan-European guarantee fund is just 
such a project. The proposal states that the Commission 
will submit a report on the feasibility of that project by 
the end of 2014.
According to the Commission, such a fund could cut the 
administrative costs by around €  40 million per annum 
and would permit improved management of bank failures 
(EC, 2010d), as a single failure would have less impact on 
a European fund than on a national fund.
However, it is complicated to set up a pan-European 
fund, especially in view of the legal aspects inherent 
in its financing. The introduction of such a system first 
requires full harmonisation of the national systems. The 
proposal for a new Directive could be viewed as a first 
step towards a pan-European scheme, as it harmonises 
the way the schemes work ; it also stipulates that funding 
must amount to 1.5  % of eligible deposits and that the 
funds can make use of mutual borrowing facilities. Such 
a system would also be a logical development, taking 
account of the creation of a pan-European structure for 
prudential supervision.
Deposit guarantee schemes versus bank 
resolution systems
The operation of the deposit guarantee scheme must 
also be viewed, as described above, in the context of the 
package of measures intended to boost the resilience of 
the financial system. Special attention should focus on 
bank resolution systems (i.e. organising an orderly failure), 
aimed at the continuity of banking services so that depos-
itors retain access to their deposits, e.g. by their transfer 
to another – sound – bank. A proposal for European 
legislation on bank resolution funds is in preparation (EC, 
2010a). The literature often refers to prompt corrective 
action, namely the opportunity for supervisory authori-
ties, central banks and public authorities to intervene in 
(1)  This concerns the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA). The new European supervisory authority will be 
responsible for the supervision of deposit guarantee schemes and their mutual 
coordination. It will also be required to communicate information on the risk 
profile of financial institutions.
(2)  BIS (2010).
(3)  See, for example, EC (2010b) and IMF (2010).104
the management of a credit institution before it actually 
becomes insolvent. Such measures are an alternative 
to deposit guarantee schemes and should be balanced 
against each other.
In a number of countries, deposit guarantee schemes also 
present the characteristics of bank resolution systems. In 
the United States, Canada and South Korea, in particular, 
guarantee funds can intervene in the management of 
banks, according to strict rules, and in extreme situations 
they can even take over the management of such institu-
tions and proceed to repay or transfer deposits. However, 
such wide powers whereby these funds may also perform 
a prudential supervision role necessitate a proportionate 
increase in their resources. Early preventive measures do 
not always avoid the subsequent declaration of failure 
and the need to repay the deposits. It would not be in the 
public interest if the cost of transferring the deposits were 
to exceed the cost of repaying the depositors.
Conclusion
During the recent financial crisis, the deposit guar-
antee scheme in Belgium – as in other European 
countries – played a role in preventing bank runs and 
restoring confidence  : to that end, the intervention 
ceilings were raised substantially and the scope of the 
scheme was extended to include certain life insurance 
policies. Finally, the expansion of the system’s coverage 
had to be financed by a sharp increase in the contribu-
tions from financial institutions. First of all, that meas-
ure had a positive impact on the budget  ; secondly, 
increased contributions may also boost the credibility of 
the deposit guarantee system.
A recent European proposes further ambitious reforms. 
Besides a better consumer protection, the European 
deposit guarantee schemes would be largely harmo-
nised, thus also promoting European financial integra-
tion. Risk-weighted financing of the schemes should 
counteract moral hazard, benefiting financial stability. 
However, this proposal has yet to be approved by the 
European Parliament and the Council. Its impact ought 
to be assessed in the light of the broader package of 
measures aimed at making the financial system more 
resilient, such as the new prudential supervision struc-
ture, the Basel III proposal for stricter capital and liquid-
ity requirements, and the possible new levies on the 
financial sector.105
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